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Abstract
Successful Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) planning initiatives in Latin American cities 
involved complex interactions among stakeholders, politicians and planners. Asian 
cities under different geo-political settings may not be able to achieve successful BRT 
planning initiatives under similar circumstances. This paper reviews the recent mass 
transit planning initiatives, especially BRT planning initiatives, in Asian cities and 
identifies the issues and realities of such initiatives in different regions of Asia. The 
prospect, suitability and importance of BRT as a sustainable mass transit system for 
Asian cities are also discussed. Guidelines are suggested for probable successful BRT 
planning initiatives under different geo-political contexts of Asian cities. 
Introduction
BRT has emerged as an economically self-reliant mass transit system with sig-
nificant potential for budget-constrained developing cities. The successful BRT 
systems, particularly in Latin American cities, have evolved through broad-based 
participation of all the actors and fair distribution of costs, risks and benefits 
among the same (Ardila 2004; Wright 2005). Wright (200) mentioned that Latin 
American busways show that the availability of capital is secondary to political 
and technical will. Patrick and William (2005) also emphasized the need for pub-
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lic-private partnership (PPP) in financing, implementing and operating successful 
BRT systems integrated with multi-modal transport networks. While such a broad 
participatory planning process has taken place under the umbrella of the powerful 
mayors of Latin American cities (Hook 2005; Ardila 2004), by tradition, mayors of 
most Asian cities do not enjoy that sort of power due to the bureaucratic central 
government influence and absence of proper city government structure, in many 
cases. Often, urban transport decision making involves multiple agencies such as 
ministries for communication, city mayors, city transport authorities, and some-
times even finance/prime ministries. While these are the top layer of decision mak-
ers, there is also a bottom layer of stakeholders such as transit operators, planners 
and civic groups. It is not easy to track a planning and decision making process in 
such a situation involving multiple parties. The case of BRT planning appears to be 
more intricate, as it needs a general acceptability among all parties because of the 
intrinsic characteristics of BRT system development. BRT systems need coopera-
tion and participation from all quarters as successful BRT systems emerge from 
contributions of public-private partnership and collaboration. Hook (2004) men-
tioned that the relationship between BRT and regulatory and institutional reform 
is less understood, although it is one of the most important elements distinguish-
ing BRT from normal busways. Even with all the advantages of BRT, such as low 
cost, flexibility and easy installation, it hardly generates any self-motivated interest 
group, as the system rarely allows favor to a particular party. So, the question now 
is, who would promote those advantages of BRT and work through the complex 
interactive roadmap of multi-agency planning tasks to ultimately see through the 
adoption of a comprehensive BRT system plan. This paper reviews the current 
mass transit planning initiatives of a few Asian cities in the light of the above issues. 
Recent institutional, political and planning dynamics in the cities are analyzed in 
detail. Finally, guidelines are suggested for the BRT planning process initiatives for 
Asian developing cities in the light of those experiences.
Mass Transit Initiatives of Asian Cities
Asia has almost 200 cities with populations over  million, including 98 cities in 
China and 35 in India (Singh 2005), two of the world’s most populous countries. 
Most of these populations, especially the lower-middle to low income groups, are 
heavily dependent on public transportation. In the absence of an adequate public 
transportation supply, most of these cities’ streets are crowded with two-wheelers 
and other motorized para-transits (Singh 2005; Hoque and Hossain 2005; Hossain 
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et al. 2003; Hossain and McDonald 998), which cannot substitute for a mass 
transit system appropriate to the demand volumes of these cities. Also, it is worth 
mentioning that some of the middle income cities, such as Kuala Lumpur, Bang-
kok, Beijing and Shanghai, are going through rapid motorization at an alarming 
rate (Townsend 200; UN ESCAP 2005; Energy Foundation 2005). Although these 
cities invested heavily in road-based infrastructure, the rate of motorization always 
outpaces the supply of road network. Therefore, cities of both income ranges are 
facing the problems of congestion, safety, traffic-related air pollution, and exces-
sive (80 to 90% in Asia) commercial energy consumption in the transport sectors 
(UNESCAP 2005). For example, approximately 60 percent of the Bangkok popula-
tion suffers from throat irritation, apparently caused by air pollution; Dhaka’s air 
pollution causes 0,800 premature deaths and 6.5 million extra cases of sickness 
per annum, with an estimated loss of US$200-800 million and a simultaneous con-
gestion and accident loss of US$520 million per annum (Haque and Hossain 2004). 
Average one-way commuting trip time to work in Bangkok is about  hour. All of 
these put into question the future sustainability of these cities. With this sort of 
caution in the air for recent years, regional governments are trying to address the 
challenge through a combination of increased investment in road stock and the 
development of complementary public transport systems, with clear emphasis on 
public transport systems in recent time. Successful embracing of transit-oriented 
urban transport development and BRT initiatives by upper income cities like Seoul 
and Taipei (Pucher et al. 2005; Chang and Sun 2004) have created motivation for 
similar approaches by the developing cities. Such public transport initiatives and 
planning approaches undertaken by a number of developing Asian cities are dis-
cussed below.
China
Sustainable transport and other development initiatives in the world’s most pop-
ulous and rapidly growing economy, China, are important for the stability of the 
Asian region and the world as a whole. Phenomenal economic growth during the 
last two decades has resulted in a significant increase in car ownership with associ-
ated congestion, air pollution, and enormous increases in gasoline consumption 
(Energy Foundation 2005; Chang 2005; ADB 200). Rising oil prices have set the 
energy security and overall viability of Chinese cities on an unsustainable course. 
Under the circumstances, after a series of meetings and consultations with scien-
tists, policy makers, business leaders, and analysts in China and the United States, 
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a consortium of international organizations consisting of the David and Lucile 
Packard Foundation, the Energy Foundation, and the William and Flora Hewlett 
Foundation launched the China Sustainable Energy Program (CSEP) recently. The 
mission of the program is to assist in China’s transition to a sustainable energy 
future by promoting energy efficiency and renewable energy. Transport is the 
primary consumer of the majority of the country’s mostly-imported oil and has 
understandably drawn the attention of the program. The CSEP team developed 
the China Transportation Program Strategy with three clear goals, including the 
identification of BRT systems as means toward sustainable transportation systems. 
This initiative worked as a catalyst in generating interest among local politicians, 
mayors and decision makers. Since November 200, as many as 4 Chinese cities 
have implemented a few BRT corridors or are in the process of implementing or 
are actively planning for a BRT system, as shown in the Table . Chang (2005) 
reported five key factors for BRT success in China: support from mayor(s); support 
from city councils; coordinated efforts of the new transportation commissions; 
comprehensive planning/design; and contributions of international teams. This 
shows the importance of strong political support and knowledgeable planning 
teams in an environment of well-integrated institutional setups for successful 
BRT planning initiatives. In some cities, bus manufacturers also are included in 
the development of BRT plans. This will ensure availability of needs-based, well-
designed buses and help the development of local industries for an emerging large 
BRT market in China and the region, ultimately reducing BRT installation costs 
and making the system even more viable financially. 
It is striking to see so many successful BRT planning initiatives in China within only 
three to four year’s time; BRT planning initiatives took decades in Latin American 
cities. The success was possible largely due to the catalytic initiatives from the 
CSEP group and a new generation of open-minded politicians in China, as well 
as China hosting the 2008 summer Olympic Games and World EXPO 200. The 
total investment in urban transport for China’s major cities is expected to reach 
the equivalent of US$97 billion during the next five years, according to Chinese 
government figures (Wynne 2004).
India
India is the second most populous country in the world and home to about 35 
cities with populations of more than  million. This is another Asian region with 
serious need for sustainable urban transport development. India has had favor-
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able rapid economic growth for more than a decade now. Increased income has 
paved the way for rapidly increasing levels of motor vehicle ownership and use, 
particularly in city areas. The emerging traffic situation has resulted in alarming 
levels of congestion, air pollution, noise, and traffic danger (Singh 2005). For most 
segments of the population, mobility and accessibility have declined with time 
(Pucher et al. 2005). Although the four mega-cities (Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and 
Chennai) have rail-based mass transit routes, the limited coverage of systems 
in these cities and generally unorganized, poor-quality, inadequate bus services 
(similar to other Indian cities) have resulted in an improper public transport sup-
ply in Indian cities. Commenting on the existing public transport supply, especially 
the bus system of small- and medium-sized Indian cities, Pucher et al. (2005) 
Table 1. BRT Initiatives in Chinese Cities
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described them as old and poorly designed, inadequately maintained, dangerously 
overcrowded, undependable, and slow. Also, it is claimed that the systems require 
increasingly large subsidies, in spite of extremely high passenger volumes, due to 
inefficiency, outdated technology, incompetent management, corruption, over-
staffing, and low worker productivity. However, it would be unfair not to mention 
that this poor situation emerges from the background of government-regulated 
and politically-sensitive low bus fare structures (less than US 2c per km). Also, 
apart from Delhi, no significant efforts have been made recently to improve bus 
travel, which accounts for over 90 percent of all public transport use in India. With 
sharply increasing income and car ownership levels in Indian cities, it is important 
to preserve the competitive position of public transit (in this case, mainly bus) in 
order to be able to retain and/or increase the patronage through improved quality 
of service. 
Recent major rail-based metro investments have been made in Kolkata and Delhi. 
The first phase of the Kolkata Metro, with a route length of 6.5 km, was completed 
in 995, and construction for a second expansion phase of 8.7 km is now under 
way at a cost of about USD$200 million (Kolkata Metro webpage 2006). The Delhi 
Metro, with three routes and a combined length of 65 km, was implemented at an 
estimated cost of USD$2.5 billion and has taken a construction period of about 7.5 
years (DMRC 2006). As pressure on central and local governments mounts from 
other cities for implementing similar metro projects, initiatives are coming up in 
a few cities for suitable transit options. Referring to the successful BRT system of 
Latin America, researchers (Wynne 2004; Leal and Bertini 2003; Pucher et al. 2005) 
suggested improved bus services like BRT systems for large and medium cities of 
India as a cost-effective, quicker, or more feasible solution. 
In 2004, a pre-feasibility study of BRT system in Hyderabad was made by ITDP, 
and findings were presented by the ITDP team to the city’s Chief Minister, who 
was nearly convinced of the value of implementing a BRT system (ITDP 2005). In 
spring 2005, however, after a round of staff changes, Hyderabad’s urban develop-
ment authorities made an interim recommendation to pursue a three-corridor, 
elevated rail system based on a proposal from the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation 
(DMRC). While not yet finalized, the system will be financed through a build-
operate-transfer scheme. The ITDP pre-feasibility study found that, for the same 
$. billion capital investment required for the 37-kilometer elevated metro, a 
294-kilometer BRT system could be built. However, political support for the BRT 
concept waned when decision makers faced some difficult decisions regarding the 
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right-of-way. Also, India’s big cities are looking at ways to emulate the grand sys-
tem like Delhi Metro, charmed by its image factor. However, during the opening 
of the third line of Delhi Metro, the prime minister of India determined that it was 
not necessary that all Indian states emulate the same model, as each place had dif-
ferent requirements. “There are other cheap transport alternatives available. The 
Central government will encourage all proven technologies that are economically 
feasible,” the prime minister explained. Delhi has now taken up a BRT scheme 
of about 300km throughout the capital, realizing that, due to costs and lengthy 
implementation time constraints, only limited extension of rail-based systems are 
feasible. Other cities actively considering suitable forms of mass transit options are 
Bangalore, Ahmedabad and Pune. 
An international initiative such as in China seems necessary in India also. ITDP has 
already started the initiative, but it probably needs more collaborators, as adop-
tion of BRT planning in Indian cities by agencies involved might not be as smooth 
as in the cases of China because of the numerous parties and frequently chang-
ing power bases in Indian politics. There is no shortage of planning and technical 
capability in India to carry forward the required initiatives, but the institutional 
integration and political support could be a barrier, and an international team 
may act as a bridging media. 
Bangkok
In Bangkok, a wide array of generally uncoordinated government agencies claim 
to be dealing with transport; there are at least 27 agencies (mostly public) with 
responsibilities related to urban transport (Townsend 200). Even after creation 
of the Office of the Commission for the Management of Land Transport (OCMLT) 
in 992, with a mission to regulate the plans and programs of all transport agen-
cies, there is still lacking an authoritative multi-modal transport master plan. 
Some of the transport planning, approving and operation agents include Bangkok 
Metropolitan Administration (BMA): the local city government; Office of the 
Commission for the Management of Land Traffic; Office of Transport and Traffic 
Policy and Planning (OTP); Bangkok Mass Transit System Company (BTSC), the 
company that operates the Skytrain; Bangkok Metro Company (BMCL), the com-
pany chosen to operate the subway; and Bangkok Mass Transit Authority (BMTA). 
While at all governmental levels public transport has been given adequate priority, 
planning and adoption of a certain public transport technologies is always a dif-
ficult job in this sort of multi-agent planning platform.
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In recent years, Bangkok’s planning bodies have come up with three different types 
of mass transit systems for Bangkok. The Skytrain (23.5km route length), the first 
rail transit system in Bangkok, has been in operation since December 999 and is 
known as Green Line. This elevated train is currently operated by BTSC. An under-
ground subway is the second component of Bangkok’s mass transit network and 
is known as Blue Line (20km route length); it is currently operated by BMC (Zhi 
Liu 2005). These two systems were implemented at a cost of US$60 million and 
US$55 million per km, respectively. Another 247 km of subway is also planned, of 
which the 29km Purple Line extension is already under construction, with a budget 
of US$260 million. A project budget allocation of US$5 billion is also earmarked 
for the remainder of the metro extension. The third transit establishment planned 
is the Bangkok BRT system, which is a part of the greater mass transit project.
The central government played the key role in implementing the two train-based 
systems, while the local bodies and directorates are entrusted with the responsi-
bility of the BRT system. BMA and OTP are in a “tug of war” with BRT planning 
and adoption. OTP planned 9 routes with a total coverage of 380 km, while BMA 
planned 2 routes with a total coverage of 85 km. They also differed on the issue 
of station facilities, with BMA favoring busy stations furnished with escalators and 
air-conditioning. The Bangkok governor, apparently a BRT enthusiast, pressed 
forward the BRT plan on the background that per-km BRT route costs only one-
sixteenth of elevated Skytrain cost. Efforts were underway for construction of the 
first two lines of BRT with a total route length of 35km. Being operated by differ-
ent operators and physically separated, the integration of the system, especially 
integrating BRT with the train-based system, is considered a challenge that must 
be met for the better performance of the system. 
Also, BRT implementation is about to face resistance from general motorists in 
the upcoming election-time opinion campaign, as predicted in the local newspa-
per. The reason behind this is that BRT will directly interact with local motorists, 
thus shrinking lanes available for motorists and affecting flows. Rail-based transit 
does not cause this sort of friction as it is mostly developed without influencing 
the flow of local motorists. This initial friction could be a significant impediment 
to the implementation of BRT. But Taipei’s experiences (Chang and Sun 2004) 
show that BRT effectively saves travel time for both bus and non-bus trip mak-
ers, as travel speeds of buses as well as general traffic have increased significantly 
after the implementation of BRT. This is because interference between buses and 
other vehicles sharply decreases due to segregated lanes for BRT. Therefore, the 
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BRT planning body needs to be resilient enough to absorb these initial criticisms 
and also emphasizes the need for promoting modal shift, especially from motor-
ist groups, as soon as possible after BRT implementation so the road and the BRT 
system together create a balance in traffic demand sharing for the corridor. A few 
tools helping in this regard could be creating park-and-ride facilities and pedes-
trian and bike facilities and integrating different forms of public transport. Obvi-
ously, the role of the media and promotional activities can be significant in making 
the BRT system popular in a short period. 
Transit planning efforts in Bangkok include the progress of two different transit 
systems in parallel: a BRT system with a per km cost of about USD$.3 million, and 
the subway metro (Purple Line) with a per km cost of about USD$43.4 million. 
Although the difference in implementation costs between the two systems is stag-
gering, BRT can match the capacity of the metro with adequate fleet composition 
and road furnishings (Wright 2005). With all the potential of BRT, its future in 
Bangkok hinges on the enthusiasm of the City’s governor. Bangkok had exclusive 
bus lanes introduced in 980, with a result of either bus travel times or car travel 
times, or both, being improved significantly (Marler 982). But the gradually slack-
ened enforcement and encroachment by sharply increasing car traffic made them 
virtually ineffective (except the contra-flow lanes) by late 980s. This somehow has 
created a poor image for the Bangkok bus system, which the planned BRT system 
has to overcome for acceptance. 
In recent months, developments around BRT initiatives also took a stormy turn, 
and the governor apparently gave up the BRT project, blaming the government 
for its lack of support and deliberate delays in granting an operating license. Traf-
fic police also seem to have played a role in this by complaining that the loss of 
one lane to BRT would only worsen traffic congestion. This shows the necessity 
of strong political backing to ensure government collaboration, or at least no 
interference, and a professional planning team to overcome the doubts brought 
forward by different parties. 
Comparing this setback to the successful ongoing BRT initiatives of Jakarta, it 
seems the governor of Jakarta has substantial control over the budget allocation 
required for the project. Jakarta allocated increasing funds of some Rp 40 billion 
(US$4 million) in 2004 as compared to Rp 50 billion in 2005, and the governor 
has proposed Rp 876.70 billion for the four new busway corridor projects in 2006. 
The governor’s team also has capitalized on the unsuccessful quest for a financier 
for the rail-based metro project (ITDP 2003). Recent ITDP studies (2003, 2005) in 
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collaboration with the local universities also formed a basis for a sound BRT plan. 
The first BRT corridor of 2.9 km has experienced an increase in patrons from 
20,000 per day to over 70,000 per day within less than two years of its operation. 
The Jakarta BRT team is now poised to see through a successful BRT network 
development. 
Kuala Lumpur
Institutional fragmentation is commonly identified as a root cause of transport 
woes in Kuala Lumpur (KL), as in the case of Bangkok (Townsend 200). There are 
a number of federal and local bodies, including 0 ministries, involved in transport 
related issues; however, there is no single agency to see through transport plan-
ning, regulation and implementation in KL (Saleh 2005). The lack of an institution 
with oversight and visions for the future of multi-modal transport development 
integrated with urban land use has encouraged individual public and private 
stakeholders to initiate uncoordinated transit projects. With a city governing body 
(including the mayor) appointed by the King, the local government lacks in strong 
political power. All this has led to a situation where the federal government and 
politicians, especially the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) of the prime minister, 
have emerged as the most influential forum for transportation planning initiatives 
in greater KL.
The Klang Valley region (KV) went through rapid urbanization and sprawling 
development in the economic boom of the 980s and 990s. Increased income 
and sprawling land use development encouraged rapid motorization, and car-
based traffic demand outpaced the expansion of expressways and toll roads. 
Under pressure from high traffic demand and congestion problems, a few rail-
based transit mega projects were initiated independently by politicians and pri-
vate firms. As a result, the STAR LRT system, with two routes (combined length of 
26km), was implemented at a cost of US$.4 billion during 996-998; the PUTRA 
LRT system, with route length of 29km, was implemented at a cost of US$.74 bil-
lion during 995-999; the KL Monorail, with a route length of 8.6km, was imple-
mented at a cost of about US$0.5 billion during 996-2003; and two conventional 
commuting rail corridors of KTM were refurbished at an unknown cost. Although 
efforts were made to integrate these individual systems, only limited physical and 
almost no fare integration took place until 2004. Also, KL, a city of 243 sq km with 
sprawling development well beyond this boundary, has a network coverage of only 
six routes of mass transit, which seems inadequate; accordingly, the vast majority 
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of the city and its outskirts are literally beyond transit coverage and linked only 
by bus services. Domination of the private-car-led congestion on the road and 
repeated failed attempts of bus service regulation, integration and improvement 
have resulted in a poor service image for the bus. With the dwindling patronage, 
bus operators suffered financial losses which further deteriorated service quality. 
As a result, transit modal share further declined to 6 percent in 2003 (BINAFIKIR 
2005) from 9.7 percent in 997, even after the introduction of three new rail-
based rapid transit systems during the early part of that period. Most transit inves-
tors ran into deep financial trouble. As a consequence, while traffic congestion has 
already become a perennial woe for KL residents, there is a looming prospect of 
doubling of the vehicle population in KV in next 7 to 0 years (NEAC 2003). 
Although officially guided by a 99 privatization master plan to rely on conces-
sions granted to the private sector for infrastructure investments, the federal 
government played a supportive role through various means. One of these means 
was the provision of soft loans from the government to privately-financed projects 
(e.g., both LRT systems and several expressway projects). Under these conditions, 
there was an implicit guarantee against failure or “moral hazard” that has since 
caused problems in the wake of the economic crisis that began in 997 (Townsend 
200). Therefore, the central government (not the local city councils) reacted to 
the above situation by forming a special task force for KV public transport under 
the prime minister’s department, which guided a public transport restructuring 
plan (INSPAK) with the help of a private consultant study. 
Accordingly, the federal government took up the responsibility of two LRT lines 
and a few major bus companies and, at the same time, undertook initiatives for 
restructuring KV’s public transport system, with the objective of an integrated 
and efficient public transport system. A three-tier (regulating, asset owning and 
operation management) setup was planned to be introduced as a step towards 
the solution, of which only asset owning (SPNB) and operating (Rapid KL) man-
agement modules were put in place recently. SPNB, suggested to be a purely 
government-owned entity, has the responsibility of asset owning, funding and 
procurement. RapidKL, currently government-owned, has the responsibility of 
operation and asset maintenance. It has also the obligation to meet certain per-
formance criteria based on key performance indices. In the first year of operation, 
RapidKL is going for a full-scale restructuring of the KV bus network without any 
substantial demand pattern study. However, it will acquire 800 new buses through 
SPNB, arranged by government funding for establishing the changed new network 
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service. But the important institutional, planning and regulatory body is not com-
missioned yet, which might allow loopholes in the implementation of the INSPAK 
initiative. Also, this regulatory body is supposed to handle the planning, research 
and development initiatives, which are clearly currently missing. 
It is evident that, even with all initiatives to have the public transport investment 
liability on the private sector, it has bounced back to the government’s shoulder. 
Although the private road concessionaires are still surviving with the increased 
motorist patronage, the government is providing a nationwide fuel subsidy of 
around USD$3.5 billion. The only way out for the government is increasing the 
public transport patronage through an integrated wide coverage network with 
good quality service. At the same time, it must look for a financially self-sustaining 
transit system. With a lower per km cost of implementation and financially self-
sustaining experience, a BRT system can provide such wide-scale coverage without 
much financial liability on the government (Hook 2004; Ardila 2004). However, 
with the BRT initiatives in the two neighboring cities of Bangkok and Jakarta, the 
authority is clearly unmoved regarding any sort of BRT initiative. Clearly, a strong 
planning team and enthusiastic political will are missing, which were ingredients 
for successful BRT planning initiatives in Latin American cities. Although forma-
tion of the planned regulatory body and capacity building can fill the gap of the 
required planning team, the political will is unlikely to be generated from the 
currently appointed local government. The most probable political power source 
may come from the federal government, especially politicians working with the 
economic planning unit of the prime minister’s department.
Dhaka
Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, is now a city of about 2 million people, and the 
population is expected to increase to 8.5 million in the year 205 (MOC 2004; 
DITS 994). In an ideal situation, roads and lanes would be constructed on 25 
percent of the city’s surface area, but in Dhaka it is only 8 percent (DCC 2002), 
as Dhaka grew from a provincial capital to a national capitol in an unplanned 
way. Dhaka is perhaps the only city of its size without a well-organized, properly 
scheduled bus system or any other mass transport system. The transport system 
in Dhaka is characterized by different types of modes, with both motorized trans-
ports (MT) & non-motorized transport (NMT) using the same carriageway. The 
city transport system is now in a quagmire, with traffic congestion, delays, inad-
equate traffic management, conflict of jurisdictions, poor coordination among 
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organizations, and increasing air pollution problems. The city’s traffic problems 
have reached a crisis proportion—delays have tripled in the last three years and 
automobile-related air pollution has become a major health problem—such that 
these shortcomings seriously compromise the ability of the transport sector in the 
Dhaka metropolitan area to sustain economic growth and a reasonable quality of 
life (DTCB 2004). In many respects, the distribution of modal choices in Dhaka is 
unique among cities of comparable size in Asia. Almost 60 percent of the 8.5 mil-
lion weekday person trips are walk trips, and about 9.2 percent are by rickshaw 
(tricycle). For the remaining 20 percent of trips on motorized modes, .4 percent 
use an auto-rickshaw (three-wheeler), 9.2 percent travel by bus, 3. percent travel 
by private car, and 6.7 percent travel by various other modes. In terms of passen-
ger km, the share of buses is 30.6 percent and those of rickshaw and walking are 
2.7 percent and 7.7 percent, respectively (DTCB 2004). The high dependence on 
walking and rickshaw, which are both slow and typically best-suited for short trips 
on secondary roads, and a low dependence on buses in a city of 2 million people 
with an urban area of about 2,000 square km is a symptom of inefficient and inef-
fective transport operations as well as uncontrolled land-use. 
Buses and minibuses are the main motorized public transport sub-mode within 
Dhaka. There are about 2,200 registered private buses and minibuses and 400 
BRTC (Bangladesh Road Transport Corporation) buses. Recently, BRTC procured 
50 modern EURO Engine Volvo double decker buses, which have a capacity of 
60 (20 sitting and 40 standing). There are also 250 double decker buses of with 
a capacity of 03 (83 sitting and 20 standing). However, as buses negotiate mixed 
traffic including NMT, the operating speed of the buses is reduced to such an extent 
that NMT has almost become competitive in terms of speed in shorter trips, and a 
motorized three-wheeler is definitely advantageous for all trips. This situation has 
encouraged the growth of approximately 9,500 taxis, 0,000 auto rickshaws, and 
an unknown number of pedal rickshaws (in the range of 300,000 to 500,000), all 
of which cater to personalized services for passengers. A preliminary estimate of 
vehicular trip demand on the city’s 8 major bus routes showed a demand range 
of 50,000 to 350,000 per day, with peak hour per direction demand in the range of 
4,500 to 9,000 per hour (Hossain and Hossain 2003; Hossain et al. 2003). This sort of 
demand can be comfortably handled by any modern BRT system. Also, consider-
ing the affordability of residents and government financial constraints, BRT could 
be an ideal choice for Dhaka.
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Deteriorating traffic conditions have prompted several popular public campaigns 
to find urgent solutions. An important step taken by the government in was the 
formation of the Greater Dhaka Transport Planning and Coordination Board 
(DTCB) in 200 to integrate activities, coordinate stakeholders, and formulate 
policy and planning options for the city. The city mayor is the chairman of DTCB 
board, which also includes members from 7 other public and private bodies, 
including the chairmen of three peripheral local municipalities. But the organiza-
tion lacks capable manpower and other resources and, as such, has not been able 
to establish a foothold until recently. Due to this and competition among politi-
cians to deal with mega projects, most of the mass transit planning proposals and 
initiatives revolve around the communication ministry and the prime minister’s 
office, bypassing DTCB. During the tenure of earlier government (996-200), 
elevated metro rail project biddings were almost to the final stages. Although ini-
tially 32 firms expressed interest in that build-operate-transfer (BOT) bidding, at 
later stages the number decreased to only two, and a later change of government 
buried the whole initiative. 
During the current government tenure, a number of proposals for rail-based 
metro have come up, which include both subway and elevated rail systems. No 
final decision has yet been made, and the current government tenure will end 
in October 2006. During the last three five-year periods, Bangladesh has seen 
the alternation of two political parties in power and, due to unhealthy political 
animosity, one party does not seem to appreciate the ideas adopted by the other 
party. This single issue has created risk for mega projects such as the urban metro, 
so the planning and implementation of any such project could extend over more 
than a five-year period. This highlights the importance of the window of oppor-
tunity for adopting and implementing a transit system in Dhaka, as mentioned 
in Ardila’s study (2004). But to prepare for and grab that window of opportunity, 
there must be a professional setup with good institutional backup. DTCB could 
take that initiative, but, as mentioned earlier, the organization lacks adequate 
human resources, monetary support and motivation. With an adequate planning 
team setup, this situation is more suitable for adopting a BRT system, as it can be 
planned and implemented within the tenure of a government and possibly allevi-
ate transport problems, thus even helping the government’s political cause. Again, 
some kind of catalytic influence from international initiatives such as ITDP or the 
Energy Foundation Group in China and other countries may well help DTCB in 
rising to the cause of BRT development in Dhaka. 
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Lessons Learned
BRT planning initiatives involve multiple agencies in a complex stakeholders’ 
setup based on rationality and equity. Therefore, a BRT proposal is unlikely to gen-
erate any special or vested interest group to drag through the planning and adop-
tion initiatives. More and more, Asian city authorities and politicians, especially in 
China, are realizing the potential and importance of BRT systems in low to middle 
income city situations. Still, a number of rail-based metro systems are in progress 
in many parts of Asia, where BRT could have been a much better alternative in 
terms of lower fares and financial liability for the fund constrained governments. 
Governments and city authorities should be realistic in selecting a mass transit 
technology, focusing their considerations on actual needs, implementation and 
financial issues rather than emphasizing the image factor. Public transport profes-
sionals and BRT enthusiasts should take the window of opportunity offered by 
changes in government, the funding crisis for metro projects, rising oil prices, and 
international events concerning national pride. A knowledgeable planning team 
backed by strong political support seems necessary for defending the doubts put 
forward by critics and making progress through the initial period of chaos and 
resistance created mainly by car lobbyists. Whereas political backing is a key ingre-
dient for success in all BRT systems, this sort of support appears to be transient in 
Indian subcontinent. Required institutional, technical and management skills for 
BRT planning initiatives seem lacking in most Asian cities. International initiatives 
such as the Energy Foundation, the Hewlett and Packard Foundation in China, and 
ITDP initiatives in a number of cities should continue in the future years to help 
Asian cities develop sustainable transport initiatives using BRT technology.
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